Earlier this week, the New Zealand government set a 2050 emission reduction target. Gazetted under the Climate Change Act, the government proposed a greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 50 per cent by 2050, dubbed “50 by 50”.   

Much of the media attention, to date, has been on the meaningfulness of setting a 2050 target. The environmental spokesperson for the Labour Party (the opposition) Charles Chauvel, said: “Any government could set a 2050 target without worrying about whether it would be around to fulfil it.” Indeed, a 2050 target that does not have phased carbon budgets and an aggressive cleantech commercialisation strategy for those industries with limited low carbon solutions is almost entirely meaningless.

Disturbingly, what has received little media attention is the way the government proposes to meet their 50 by 50 target. The carbon accounting methodology proposed is not 'like for like', and so any reference to a 50 per cent reduction by 2050 is misleading.

The New Zealand government said on Monday that it plans to halve emissions of the six main greenhouse gases by 50 per cent from 1990 levels by 2050. The government proposes to do this by using different accounting parameters for the baseline and target years.

Under the proposal, the 2050 target refers to net emissions, while the 1990 baseline will be accounted as gross emissions.

According to UN data, gross emissions – emissions before deductions made for carbon stored from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) – from New Zealand in 1990 were 61.2 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. However, New Zealand’s net emissions – emissions after LULUCF has been counted – in 1990 were 30.1 million tonnes, while the proposed 2050 target – also net of LULUCF emissions – is 30.6 million tonnes. UN data shows net emissions rose 62.4 per cent in the period from 1990 to 2008 by 48.9 million tonnes.

By taking advantage of its forest carbon sink in the target year, but not in the baseline year, New Zealand could actually increase its net emissions by 0.5 million tonnes relative to 1990 under the proposed plan. Simply put, the 50 by 50 proposal represents an absolute increase of 1.6% by 2050 on 1990 levels.

This proposal reveals the fundamental problem of carbon accounting. By taking advantage of its forestry sinks and preventing ongoing deforestation, New Zealand can maintain a high-carbon trajectory and circumvent the costs of making the low-carbon transition.

Although the 50 by 50 proposal will not have any immediate impacts on New Zealand's emissions trading scheme, if passed, it will do little to increase the marginal cost of carbon, which ultimately increases the cost effectiveness of renewable energy and other clean technologies.

Moreover, the fact that the discussion of these rules is ongoing in international negotiations could undermine trust in the international context and serve to add further complications to the compliance regime of any post-Kyoto agreement that emerges over the coming years.

The 50 by 50 proposal provokes two thoughts. Firstly, New Zealand is trying to create a clean green brand to promote tourism and invigorate cleantech investment. On the face of it, however, by creating greenwash policies, such as the 50 by 50, the government is seemingly jeopardising the future of their tourism and burgeoning cleantech industries.

Perhaps the 50 by 50 proposal reflects the strength of industry lobbying. Agriculture, the country’s mainstay revenue generator, faces huge technological barriers to reducing methane emissions and is subject to intense international competition, and therefore will rightfully reject any aggressive climate policy because it currently has no viable low-carbon solutions.

The 50 by 50 proposal perhaps also highlights the sobering realisation that New Zealand can get away with doing little to reduce emissions because of its tiny contribution to global emissions. In reality, the economic giants – the US, the EU and China – simply do not care what New Zealand does.

Secondly, beyond the political economy of New Zealand’s climate policy, what is perhaps most interesting is the silence of the Labour party. Its failure to identify this disingenuous approach to climate policy highlights either Labour’s incompetence in recognising an opportunity to gain political footing – at a time when its popularity is embarrassingly low – or the reality that it would probably opt for the same approach if in power.

Either way, compared to Europe, which looks increasingly likely to embrace a 30 per cent target by 2020, New Zealand’s “+1.6 by 50” proposal highlights a lack of low-carbon leadership at a time when it is needed the most.

Matthew Gray is a carbon markets and policy analyst at IDEAcarbon, a London-headquartered environmental markets intelligence and advisory firm. mgray@ideacarbon.com